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SOLVING THE PARADOX OF INSIDER TRADING
COMPLIANCE
John P. Anderson *
Regulators demand the impossible when they require issuers to design and
implement effective insider trading compliance programs because insider trading is
a crime that neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange Commission has
defined with any specificity. This problem of uncertainty is then compounded by
the threat of heavy civil and criminal sanctions for violations. Placed between this
rock and hard place, issuers tend to adopt overbroad insider trading compliance
programs, which comes at a heavy price in terms of corporate culture, cost of
compensation, share liquidity, and cost of capital. The irony is that, since all of
these costs are ultimately passed along to the shareholders, insider trading
enforcement under the current regime has precisely the opposite of its intended
effect. This is the paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers, just one more
symptom of a dysfunctional insider trading enforcement regime that is in need of a
dramatic overhaul.
There are a number of conceivable paths to resolving this paradox. The most
obvious solution would be for the Securities Exchange Commission to issue a rule
or for Congress to promulgate a statute defining insider trading with greater
specificity. But while simply fixing definitions to the elements of insider trading
under the current regime would improve matters, this Article calls for a more
radical solution. It suggests that the current enforcement regime be liberalized to
permit insider trading where an issuer approves a trade in advance and has
disclosed that it permits such trading pursuant to regulatory guidelines. It argues
that such reform would lead to a more rational, efficient, and just insider trading
enforcement regime. Moreover, by aligning the interests of issuers, shareholders,
and regulators, this reform would also offer the most effective solution to the
paradox of insider trading compliance.

* Associate Professor, Mississippi College School of Law. Many thanks to Professors Miriam
Baer, Tamara Belinfanti, Mercer Bullard, Lisa Fairfax, Michelle Harner, Joan Heminway, Andrew
Lund, Veronica Root, Victoria Shannon Sahani, Maurice Stucke, and Charles Yablon for their helpful
input on an earlier draft of this paper during our Corporate Compliance Discussion Group at the 2014
Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting. I offer a special thanks to Associate
Professor Gregory Gilchrist and Assistant Professor Andrew Verstein for their detailed comments and
suggestions, which have improved the Article immensely. I would also like to thank my research
assistants, Jhasmine Andrews, Matthew Rich, Laura Barton, and Rita Santibanez for their excellent
work on this project. Finally, I thank Mississippi College School of Law for the generous financial
support provided for this project.

273

274

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................274
I.
STRONG COMPLIANCE OR ELSE! ..................................................................276
II.
BUT WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING? ...............................................................278
A. When Is Information Material? ...........................................................279
B. When Is Information Nonpublic? ........................................................282
C. When Does One Trade “On the Basis of” Information? ...................285
III.
CHALLENGES AND COSTS OF INSIDER TRADING COMPLIANCE ................287
A. Cannot Rely on Self-Policing ...............................................................287
B. Challenges and Costs of Uncertainty for Preclearance.......................288
C. Challenges and Costs of Uncertainty for Blackout Periods ...............293
IV.
THE PARADOX ...............................................................................................295
V.
10b5-1(C) TRADING PLANS: JUST MORE UNCERTAINTY ...........................296
VI.
IT’S NOT WORTH IT .......................................................................................300
A. Distinguishing Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading .................................301
B. No Economic Harm or Moral Wrong in Issuer-Licensed Insider
Trading ...................................................................................................303
C. Costs of Enforcement ............................................................................304
D. The Problem of Adverse Selection .......................................................306
VII. A PATH FORWARD ........................................................................................308
CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................310
INTRODUCTION
Regulators demand the impossible when they require issuers to design and
implement effective insider trading compliance programs because insider trading
is a crime that neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
has defined with any specificity. 1 This problem of uncertainty is then
compounded by the threat of heavy civil and criminal sanctions for violations.2
Placed between this rock and hard place, issuers tend to adopt overbroad insider
trading compliance programs, which comes at a heavy price in terms of corporate

1. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 26–27 (2d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW].
2. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). As explained in Section I infra, the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) imposes the civil penalty of
treble damages to all “controlling persons” of those who trade on material nonpublic information, if
they “knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that [a] controlled person was likely to engage in” insider
trading and failed to prevent it. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A). The failure to implement and enforce an
effective insider trading compliance program sometimes counts as “reckless disregard” by an issuer.
See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 884–85 (3d ed. 2010). In addition
to the risk of stiff civil penalties under ITSFEA, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer issuers an
added incentive to adopt insider trading compliance policies and procedures. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). The potential for criminal liability
for the failure to implement adequate compliance programs is also addressed in Section I infra.
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culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, and cost of capital. 3 The irony is
that, since all of these costs are passed along to the shareholders, insider trading
enforcement under the current regime has precisely the opposite of its intended
effect. 4 This is the paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers, just one
more symptom of a dysfunctional insider trading enforcement regime that is in
need of a dramatic overhaul.5
There are a number of conceivable paths to resolving this paradox. The
most obvious and ready-to-hand solution would be for the SEC to issue a rule or
for Congress to promulgate a statute expressly defining insider trading.6 But
while simply fixing definitions to the elements of insider trading under the
current regime would improve matters, this Article calls for a more radical
solution. It suggests that the current enforcement regime be liberalized to permit
insider trading where, inter alia, an issuer approves the trade in advance and has
disclosed that it permits such trading pursuant to express regulatory guidelines.
Issuer-proscribed insider trading and trading based on misappropriated
information would remain illegal. Such reform would lead to a more rational,
efficient, and just enforcement regime. Moreover, by aligning the interests of
issuers, shareholders, and regulators, it would also offer the most effective
solution to the paradox of insider trading compliance.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I summarizes the current civil,
criminal, and reputational consequences to issuers for failing to implement a
rigorous insider trading compliance program. Section II points out the hopeless
uncertainty surrounding the SEC’s current working definition of insider trading
as trading “‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information.” 7 Section III
identifies the significant challenges and costs to issuers in articulating and
implementing an insider trading compliance program in the midst of such legal
uncertainty. Section IV then articulates the resulting paradox of insider trading
compliance for issuers, namely that accommodating the current enforcement
regime tends to undermine the very policy goals that justify its existence.
The SEC is aware of this paradox and tried to address it in 2000 with the
adoption of an affirmative defense for insiders who trade through qualified
trading plans under Rule 10b5-1(c).8 Section V argues that, far from resolving
the paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers, Rule 10b5-1(c) has just

3.
4.
5.

See infra Section III.
See infra Sections III and IV.
See infra Section IV; see also Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1515–20 (1999) (discussing other symptoms of a dysfunctional insider trading
regime, including candid insider trading and deceptive trading).
6. Joan MacLeod Heminway has argued convincingly for just such an approach concerning the
element of materiality in the context of insider trading. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It!
Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1013–14 (2012)
[hereinafter Heminway, Just Do It!]; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1190–91 (2003) [hereinafter Heminway, A
Call for Action].
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2016).
8. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c).
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complicated matters further. For these and other reasons, Section VI suggests
that the current insider trading enforcement regime results in a net harm (both
moral and economic) to society and is therefore in urgent need of reform.
Finally, Section VII proposes a path forward. It recommends that the
existing 10b5-1(c) trading plan regime be modified to permit issuers to license
their insiders to trade based on material nonpublic information so long as certain
disclosure and reporting requirements are satisfied. Issuer-proscribed insider
trading and trading based on misappropriated information would remain
prohibited. It argues that this proposed reform would result in a more rational
and just enforcement regime because issuer-licensed insider trading is both
economically beneficial to society and morally permissible, while issuerproscribed and misappropriation trading are economically harmful and morally
impermissible. Moreover, by aligning the interests of issuers, shareholders, and
regulators, this reform would dissolve the paradox of insider trading compliance
for issuers.
I.

STRONG COMPLIANCE OR ELSE!

Firms with weak compliance programs stand to incur derivative civil and
criminal liability for the insider trading of their employees, and the penalties
(both reputational and monetary) are stiff. To begin, the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) 9 extended the civil penalty
of treble damages 10—once limited to actual traders under the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) 11—to all “controlling persons.” 12 Under ITSFEA,
issuers may incur derivative liability if they “knew or recklessly disregarded the
fact that [a] controlled person was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting

9. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
10. Firms are subject to penalties not exceeding “the greater of [$1,525,000], or three times the
amount of the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such controlled person’s violation.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1(a)(3). The penalty was last adjusted for inflation in 2013. Adjustments to Civil Monetary
Penalty Amounts, Securities Act Release No. 9387, Exchange Act Release No. 3557, Investment
Company Act Release No. 30,408, 105 SEC Docket 2898 (Feb. 27, 2013).
11. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)). Congress “did not extend the treble penalties of ITSA to
controlling persons or to employers under principles of respondeat superior.” WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 2, at 812.
12. Although ITSFEA does not expressly define “controlling person,” the legislative history
makes clear that its meaning is adopted from section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Committee
Report summarized its meaning as follows:
“Controlling person” may include not only employers, but any person with power to
influence or control the direction or the management, policies, or activities of another
person. “Control” is inferred from possession of such power, whether or not it is exercised.
The Committee expects the Commission and courts to continue to interpret the term
“controlling person” on a case-by-case basis according to the factual circumstances.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 17 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6054 (citations omitted).
See generally Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 68 N.C. L. REV. 465 (1990) (discussing the history and implications of ITSFEA).
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the violation and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts
before they occurred.”13 The failure to adopt and implement effective insider
trading compliance programs and procedures can sometimes stand as evidence
of “reckless disregard” under section 21A(b)(1)(A).14 The legislative history
reflects that the intent behind ITSFEA was to “increase the economic
incentives” for controlling persons to “supervise vigorously their employees.”15
Measured by this goal, ITSFEA appears to have had its desired effect. Most
issuers have adopted strict insider trading compliance policies and procedures 16
despite the fact that they are not expressly required to do so under the
ITSFEA.17 As one sample insider trading compliance policy explains: “Onerous
penalties may be assessed against the Company for the insider trading violations
of its employees. Accordingly, if the Company does not take active steps to
adopt preventive policies and procedures covering securities transactions by
Company personnel, the consequences could be severe.”18 In addition to the risk
of stiff civil penalties under ITSFEA, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer
issuers an added incentive to adopt insider trading compliance policies and
procedures.19 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, an issuer can
significantly reduce its “culpability score” for insider trading and other offenses
by having an effective compliance and ethics program in place.20 Moreover, the

13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A). Issuers were subject to derivative liability for their employees’
insider trading violations under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, but they were not subject to treble
damages.
14. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 884–85; Robert A. Prentice, The Future of
Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 83 (1998); Alan
M. Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corporate Compliance Programs,
18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 184–85 (1990).
15. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 814–15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 17).
16. A 1996 survey found that over ninety-two percent of sample firms had adopted a written
policy regulating insider trading. Id. at 807 n.3 (citing J.C. Bettis, J.L. Coles & M.L. Lemmon,
Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000)).
17. Only broker-dealers or investment advisor firms are required to implement a written
compliance policy. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(g), 80b-4a. Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
does, however, require that issuers disclose whether they have adopted a code of ethics for high-level
financial officers. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 16 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264). Such
codes of ethics typically include provisions concerning the improper use of insider information. See
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 884.
18. Steven Chasin, Comment, Insider v. Issuer: Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading
Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV. 859, 862 n.9 (2003) (quoting Dale E. Short & Yvonne
E. Chester, Form: Sample Insider Trading Policy, in ADVISING AND DEFENDING 437, 437 (Joseph F.
Troy & William D. Gould eds, 1998)).
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 8B2.1 (providing standards for
organizational compliance programs).
20. See id. § 8C2.5(f); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1523, 1528 n.37 (2009) (“Companies can reduce their culpability score by three points when they have
in place an effective compliance and ethics program.”). Note, however, that a 2004 amendment to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines created a
rebuttable presumption, for purposes of subsection (f)(1), that the organization did not have
an effective compliance and ethics program if an individual—(i) within high-level personnel
of a small organization; or (ii) within substantial authority personnel, but not within high-
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Justice Department has made it clear that the adoption and implementation of
effective compliance programs will impact the decision to prosecute firms for the
actions of their employees.21
II.

BUT WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING?

Despite the threat of stiff civil and criminal sanctions, the crime of insider
trading has never been defined by statute or rule.22 Congress and the SEC have
instead chosen to allow the definition to develop through the common law and
by administrative action.23 The main statutory authority for insider trading is
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, which proscribes the employment of
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in “connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”24 The courts have interpreted the language of
section 10(b) to require a showing of common law fraud.25 But since most insider
traders gain their trading advantage by silence rather than by affirmative
misrepresentation, satisfying the elements of fraud requires showing a duty to
disclose.26 The Supreme Court has identified two theories under which a section
10(b) duty to disclose prior to trading exists: (1) the “classical theory,” which
covers true insider trading (trading by the issuer’s employees or those affiliated
with the issuer); and (2) the “misappropriation theory,” which addresses outsider
trading (or trading by persons who are not employees or otherwise affiliated
with the issuer).27 Since this Article addresses issuer compliance policies, its

level personnel, of any organization, participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of,
the offense.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 8C2.5(f)(3)(B)(i)–(ii).
21. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys 8 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter, Thompson Memorandum] (“Compliance programs are established by corporate
management to prevent and to detect misconduct and to ensure that corporate activities are conducted
in accordance with all applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and rules. The Department
encourages such corporate self-policing, including voluntary disclosures to the government of any
problems that a corporation discovers on its own.”). The 2006 memorandum from Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty replaced the Thompson Memorandum, but it preserved its policy toward
compliance programs. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Dec. 12, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/December/06_odag_828.html.
22. See BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 1, at 26–28.
23. See id. at 28–29.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)–(b) (2012). Section 10(b) is implemented by the SEC in Exchange Act
Rule 10b-5, which proscribes “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2016).
25. For example, the Supreme Court has explained that section 10(b) was designed by Congress
as a “catchall” provision, and that “what it catches must be fraud.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 234–35 (1980).
26. See id. at 228 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1977)).
27. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–53 (1997).
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focus will be limited to the classical theory.
Under the classical theory, a corporate insider who seeks to benefit from
trading her company’s shares on the basis of material nonpublic information
violates a “fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence” to the
current or prospective shareholder on the other side of the transaction. 28 This
creates a duty to disclose prior to any such trading.29 But this definition of
insider trading is not enlightening without accompanying definitions of its key
elements. For example, what information counts as “material”? When is
information “nonpublic”? Under what circumstances does one trade “on the
basis of” information? Answering any of these questions forces insiders and
issuers’ compliance officers 30 to take sides in a number of ongoing scholarly
debates, splits among circuits, and conflicting direction from the SEC and the
courts.
A.

When Is Information Material?

In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,31 the Supreme Court held that information is
material for purposes of insider trading liability if “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making
a trading decision.32 In addition, “there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”33 But, as Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway explains, “[t]he facial
simplicity” of this definition “masks the complexities encountered by transaction
planners” and others in applying it.34
The qualitative materiality standard articulated in Basic is subject to
multiple interpretations.35 Who is the “reasonable shareholder” or “reasonable
investor”?36 Is she small or institutional, a short-term speculator or long-term
investor?37 What constitutes the “total mix” of information? 38 And, under any

28. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 26,
§ 551(2)(a)).
29. Id. at 230.
30. An issuer’s compliance officer is typically the issuer’s general counsel or some other
individual with access to material nonpublic information. See Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance
Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
169, 184 (2015) (“Traditionally, the [chief compliance officer] was part of the Chief Legal Officer’s
[General Counsel’s] . . . office, and sometimes one person held both titles.” (footnote omitted)).
31. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
32. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (articulating this definition of materiality in the context of proxy solicitations)).
33. Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
34. Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1138–39.
35. Id. at 1139.
36. Id. at 1152.
37. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48
CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1998) (“[I]nvestors are not homogeneous . . . .”).
38. Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1152–53.
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reading, the Basic standard demands a fact-intensive analysis that will expose
even the most thoughtful and diligent advance planning to second-guessing by
regulators and the courts ex post.39 For example, information concerning a
potential problem or opportunity for an issuer may be judged so speculative at
the time of a proposed trade that advance disclosure would be misleading to the
public. 40 But if the trade is executed without disclosure, and the problem or
opportunity later comes to pass, it will often appear material in retrospect.41 This
example illustrates the problem raised by the awareness of contingent or “soft”
information in advance of a trade.
Soft information is information that “inherently involves some subjective
analysis or extrapolation, such as projections, estimates, opinions, motives, or
intentions.”42 As Professors William Wang and Marc Steinberg explain, such
information “does not necessarily relate to expectations regarding the future, but
may include any statement that cannot be factually supported, whether due to a
lack of substantiating data or because the information consists primarily of
subjective evaluations or opinions.”43 In Basic, the Supreme Court addressed the
problem of soft information by suggesting that its materiality should be
determined “upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
the company activity.”44 But, rather than improve clarity, the Basic “probabilitymagnitude” test has itself been criticized as vague and unhelpful. 45
The Basic probability-magnitude test appears at first blush to be modeled
after the famous Hand formula from tort law. 46 Under that formula, liability is
determined by weighing the product of the probability of injury and its “gravity”
against the “burden of adequate precautions.”47 If the former is greater than the
latter, then liability is imposed for failure to take adequate precautions.48 But the
Basic test adopts only half of the equation. It offers nothing corresponding to the
“burden of adequate precautions” value in the Hand formula. 49 In other words,
39. See id. at 1140 (“[T]his failure of [regulatory] guidance may . . . lead to allegations that there
has been a failure of adequate disclosure, even with thoughtful advance planning.”).
40. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 936–37 (1999).
41. See id.
42. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 125 (quoting Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the
Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information:
Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1116 (1987)).
43. Id.
44. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)); see also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1065–66 (9th Cir.
1998) (concluding that the soft information at issue was material).
45. See, e.g., Chasin, supra note 18, at 868–69.
46. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 67 (2014) [hereinafter
BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER T RADING LAW].
47. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
48. Id. (“[I]if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less than PL.”).
49. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 67.
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the Basic formula offers no objective threshold for materiality.50 As Professor
Stephen Bainbridge puts it, the Court “never tells us how high a probability or
how large a magnitude is necessary for information to be deemed material.”51
Consequently, insiders who trade based on speculative information must do so
“knowing that a jury, acting with the benefit of hindsight, may reach a different
conclusion about how probability and magnitude should be balanced” than they
do at the time of the trade. 52
Finally, there is the disturbing problem of “bootstrapping” by courts when
making materiality determinations. 53 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 54 the
Second Circuit explained that “a major factor in determining whether”
information is material “is the importance attached to the [information] by those
who knew about it.”55 And, according to the court, an insider’s choice to trade
alone can serve as an indication of such importance.56 In Basic, the Supreme
Court confirmed that “trading (and profit making) by insiders can serve as an
indication of materiality.”57 But if trading alone can serve as an indication of
materiality, then, as Professor Bainbridge points out, “the materiality
requirement becomes meaningless because all information in the defendant’s
possession when he or she traded would be material.”58 Taken to the extreme
(and nothing in the definition of materiality offered by the courts precludes this),
any information that an insider actually trades on can therefore be deemed
material.
In sum, the lack of a clear and objective standard permits almost any
information to be deemed material for purposes of insider trading liability, at
least with the benefit of hindsight. Such flexibility can be quite useful to the SEC
and prosecutors. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the SEC has
openly resisted efforts to bring greater clarity to the definition of materiality.59

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 68.
54. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 851. The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur were charged
with violating insider trading laws after they made representations to the investing public stating there
was a lack of information on drilling results from a project in Ontario, Canada. Id. at 839–42. The
insiders were aware that these results preliminarily showed the possibility of a profitable strike, and
traded while in possession of such information. Id. The issue before the court was whether this
information was “material.” Id. at 842.
56. Id. (“[T]he timing by those who knew of it of their stock purchases and their purchases of
short-term calls—purchases in some cases by individuals who had never before purchased calls or even
TGS stock—virtually compels the inference that the [information was material] . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
57. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988).
58. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 68.
59. See Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1140 (noting the SEC “purposefully has
left ambiguous the effect of applying the existing materiality standard to any specific factual
situation”); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,

282

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

This might lead one to conclude that ambiguity in the test for materiality leaves
corporate employees charged with insider trading little alternative but to defend
by claiming that the information they traded upon was public at the time of
trading. But the test for whether information is public is no clearer than the
standard for materiality.
B.

When Is Information Nonpublic?

In his dissenting opinion in Dirks v. SEC,60 Justice Blackmun expressed
frustration that
the SEC seemingly has been less than helpful in its view of the nature
of disclosure necessary to satisfy the disclose-or-refrain duty. The
[SEC] tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade on
that information unless they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them
how to disclose.61
Blackmun added, “This seems to be a less than sensible policy, which it is
incumbent on the [SEC] to correct.”62 Despite this admonition, the SEC has yet
to issue a rule on proper disclosure (i.e., on when information will be deemed
public for purposes of insider trading liability).63 And this is a problem, for, as
one commentator puts it, “While on its face the concept might seem simplistic,
the dividing line between public and nonpublic information is porous.”64
In the absence of a statute or rule defining when information becomes
public, the SEC and the courts have applied two tests: the “dissemination and
absorption” test and the “efficient market” test.
Under the dissemination and absorption test, to become public, information
must first be “disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities
marketplace in general through recognized channels of distribution.”65 Courts
51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter August 24, 2000 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Release]
(acknowledging that “materiality judgments can be difficult,” but that the SEC does not “believe an
appropriate answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test”); John M. Fedders, Qualitative
Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 42
(1998) (pointing out that the SEC has “stubbornly refused to promulgate rules designed to fill in the
details of a broadly stated qualitative standard of materiality”).
60. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
61. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 145 (noting that the SEC has not issued a rule on
proper disclosure and has preferred to adopt a case-by-case, fact-based approach). Even Regulation
Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) (adopted in 2000) does not define “nonpublic.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–
243.103 (2016). The SEC does, however, offer some guidance: “In order to effect a meaningful public
disclosure of corporate information, it must be disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the
securities marketplace in general through recognized channels of distribution, and public investors
must be afforded a reasonable waiting period to react to the information.” Faberge, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 10,174, 1973 WL 149283, at *6 (May 25, 1973).
64. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories,
Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151, 170 (2011).
65. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 10,174, 1973 WL 149283, at *6 (May 25, 1973)).
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have understood the requirement that the disclosure be “general” to mean that it
must not favor “any special person or group.”66 So, for example, courts have
found appearances on the Dow Jones broad tape67 or on the Reuters Financial
Report wire service68 to be sufficient dissemination. But dissemination over less
recognized wire systems (e.g., AutEx) has been found insufficient because it
reached only a limited number of subscribers.69 Dissemination is, however, only
half the test. The information must also be “absorbed by the investing public,”
and absorption is not necessarily simultaneous with dissemination. 70 As the court
explained in Texas Gulf Sulphur, “Where the news is of a sort which is not
readily translatable into investment action, insiders may not take advantage of
their advance opportunity to evaluate the information by acting immediately
upon dissemination.”71 Just when information is translatable into investment
action is unclear, and opinions vary widely on this point.72 Some have suggested
that absorption occurs as little as fifteen minutes after information hits the
wire.73 In SEC v. Ingoldsby,74 however, the court held that information of a
change in leadership remained nonpublic nine days after a press release and
eight days after it was highlighted in a Wall Street Journal article because the
issuer was small and the information had not been fully digested by the relevant
investing public.75
The omnipresence of the Internet has made the question of dissemination
and absorption of information still more unpredictable and inscrutable.76
Companies can now “functionally” disseminate information without filing it with
the SEC or releasing it to a public news source (e.g., by posting it on Twitter,
66. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 n.12 (quoting Faberge, Inc., 1973 WL 149283, at *6).
67. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that
information remains nonpublic “until [it] could reasonably have been expected to appear over the
media of widest circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape”).
68. See, e.g., duPont Glore Forgan, Inc. v. Arnold Bernhard & Co., 73 Civ. 3071, 1978 WL 1062,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978).
69. See, e.g., Faberge, Inc., 1973 WL 149283, at *6.
70. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 145.
71. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854 n.18.
72. E.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading
Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 275–76 (1999) (noting that “there is no clear rule regarding
what period of time constitutes a reasonable period for absorption. . . . [and] [r]esults . . . have varied
widely” based on the issuer and the nature and complexity of the information).
73. See Billard v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting 2 ALAN
R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7.4(7)(B)
(1967)).
74. CIV. A. No. 88–1001–MA, 1990 WL 120731 (D. Mass. May 15, 1990).
75. Ingoldsby, 1990 WL 120731, at *5.
76. See Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 64, at 170 (“Due to the prevalence of online message
boards, social networking, and blogs, information and rumors about companies can spread quickly to
millions of interconnected investors. In some cases those rumors are leaked by company insiders. The
growth of so-called watchdog groups, such as Wikileaks, have generated a new level of uncertainty as
to what information is considered ‘nonpublic.’”); see also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 146
(“The development of the Internet has made it more difficult to determine when information is
public.”).
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Facebook, mass email, posting on the company website, etc.).77 But there is no
guarantee that such functional dissemination will be recognized as legally
sufficient by the SEC.78 At the end of the day, issuers are left guessing as they
navigate these “murky waters.”79
Vagueness in the SEC’s preferred dissemination and absorption test80 has
led some courts to adopt an alternative method, based on the “efficient capital
market hypothesis” (ECMH), for determining when information is public for the
purposes of section 10(b) insider trading liability.81 The ECMH comes in
“weak,” “semi-strong,” and “strong formulations.”82 The semi-strong
formulation is the most widely accepted; it “posits that at any given time, share
prices in an efficient market will incorporate all publicly available information
relating to publicly traded companies (in addition to general information about
the economy as a whole).” 83 Under the efficient market approach, information is
considered public when it is “impounded in [the] price” of the stock by traders in
the active investment community, regardless of whether the issuer has disclosed
the information by public announcement or SEC filing. 84 After all, once
impounded in the price the information cannot be misused by the trader.85 So,
under the ECMH approach, information may be “public” for purposes of insider
trading liability even though the general investing public may have no access to
it. 86
The ECMH approach, however, generates problems of its own. It may be
possible for an expert witness and jury to look at a stock’s price charts months or

77. Prentice, supra note 72, at 279.
78. See, e.g., August 24, 2000 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Release, supra note 59, at
51,724. (noting that posting on a corporate website is not sufficient for “public disclosure” under
Regulation FD); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 146–47 (suggesting that certain methods of
disseminating information on the Internet may not satisfy the dissemination and absorption
approach); Prentice, supra note 72, at 279–93 (discussing available technology for the release of
information that the SEC has not yet provided guidance on).
79. Prentice, supra note 72, at 279.
80. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 64, at 171–72 (the SEC has “clung” to the dissemination and
absorption theory).
81. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 555–65 (1984) (providing an excellent summary of the ECMH).
82. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (providing the first modern articulation of the efficient capital market
hypothesis and its division into weak, semi-strong, and strong forms). See also Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 81, at 555 (recognizing Fama’s article as the first to divide efficient market theory into
weak, semi-strong, and strong forms).
83. Prentice, supra note 72, at 277.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We agree that
information may be considered public for Section 10(b) purposes even though there has been no
public announcement and only a small number of people know of it. The issue is not the number of
people who possess it but whether their trading has caused the information to be fully impounded into
the price of the particular stock. Once the information is fully impounded in price, such information
can no longer be misused by trading because no further profit can be made.”).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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years later and determine whether information was impounded, 87 but it is far
more difficult for traders to make this determination at the moment of trading.
After all, how can one know in advance of one’s trade whether a sufficient
number of traders in the active investment community are aware of the relevant
information? One cannot simply monitor price movement. No movement in
stock price could reflect prior impoundment, a lack of dissemination, or the
introduction of offsetting collateral information. Some price movement may
reflect only partial impoundment,88 or it may reflect the impact of collateral
information. There is simply no way to be certain ex ante.
In sum, the SEC and the courts have set a demanding threshold for
publicity (dissemination and absorption, or impoundment). Absent explicit
conditions of satisfaction it is often impossible for traders to know whether the
threshold has been crossed at the time of trading.89 But, at the end of the day,
just how worrisome should ambiguity in the elements of materiality and publicity
be, given that section 10(b) insider trading liability is a form of common law
fraud requiring scienter?90 Shouldn’t an insider at least be able to trade with
confidence so long as she is not trading firm shares strategically (i.e., on the basis
of material nonpublic information), but rather to diversify or to gain access to
cash? The SEC and the courts give different answers to this question.
C.

When Does One Trade “On the Basis of” Information?

Section 10(b) imposes liability only on insiders who trade in their own
company’s shares “on the basis of material nonpublic information.”91 But there
are almost always a myriad of nonstrategic reasons that could explain any given
insider trade. Such explanations are easy to manufacture but difficult to
disprove. Historically, the SEC addressed this challenge of proof by taking the
position that the element of scienter in Rule 10b-5 could be satisfied by proving
the insider’s knowing possession of material nonpublic information, even if it
could not be demonstrated that the possession of this information caused the
trading.92 This strategy, however, met resistance in the courts. In 1998, the
Second Circuit rejected the SEC’s proposed knowing possession standard for
civil insider trading liability in SEC v. Adler.93 The Adler court held that the
element of scienter for insider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 requires proof that the insider “used” or “[took] advantage of” material
nonpublic information. 94 Then, later that same year, the Ninth Circuit expressly

87. E.g., id.
88. E.g., id. (noting that though the stock price began to move at the time of trading, it was not
yet fully impounded).
89. See Prentice, supra note 72, at 270 (contending that the publicity test is “demanding, yet
vague”).
90. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
91. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1996).
92. See BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 1, at 92–93.
93. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
94. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333–37.
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rejected the knowing possession standard for criminal insider trading liability in
United States v. Smith. 95 Sensing that the circuits were trending against its
favored possession test, 96 the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000.97
Under 10b5-1(b), the SEC defines trading “on the basis of” inside
information as trading while “aware” of material nonpublic information.98
Though the SEC did not expressly define the scienter element of 10b-5 liability
in terms of “knowing possession,” the release suggests that awareness means the
same thing, explaining that “the goals of insider trading prohibitions . . . are best
accomplished by a standard closer to the ‘knowing possession’ standard.”99 The
SEC claims its adoption of 10b5-1(b) has not diminished the element of scienter
required for insider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.100 But a
number of commentators have suggested that the rule change draws insider
trading closer to being a strict liability offense101 and question the SEC’s
authority for the change, particularly in the criminal context. 102 Thus, with the
SEC and federal courts potentially at odds over the proper definition of “on the
basis of” as it relates to the mental element of insider trading liability, traders are
forced to take sides. And when the mere awareness test under Rule 10b5-1(b) is
combined with vagueness in the definitions of materiality and publicity, a
conservative insider may decline to trade altogether.103 For, as demonstrated
above, corporate insiders will almost never enjoy complete confidence that they
are not “aware” of some information that could be deemed material and
nonpublic in hindsight. Though the federal courts may be ready to vindicate an
insider who did not use inside information strategically, few are ready to trade

95. 155 F.3d 1051, 1066–69 (9th Cir. 1998).
96. See August 24, 2000 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Release, supra note 59, at
51,727; John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From Trading Plan
Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 349 [hereinafter Anderson, A Sea Change]
(describing the SEC’s proposal of 10b5-1 as a way to avoid “further erosion” of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by the courts).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2016).
98. Id. § 240.10b5-1(b).
99. August 24, 2000 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Release, supra note 59, at 51,727.
100. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881, 73 SEC Docket
3, 2000 WL 1201556, at *22 (Aug. 15, 2000) (“Scienter remains a necessary element for liability under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Rule 10b5-1 does not change
this.”).
101. E.g., Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 375; Allan Horwich, The Origin,
Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 921–22 (2007); Carol B.
Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147,
196–99 (2003); Kevin E. Warner, Note, Rethinking Trades “on the Basis of” Inside Information: Some
Interpretations of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 306 (2003).
102. E.g., BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 1, at 93 (“The bulk of the evidence . . .
raises serious doubts as to the validity of Rule 10b5-1.”); Horwich, supra note 101, at 944–49.
103. This is not entirely true. Rule 10b5-1(c) provides an affirmative defense for insiders who
trade within a plan that is qualified under the rule. It is argued below, however, that recent SEC staff
interpretations of 10b5-1(c) should undermine traders’ confidence in the effectiveness of these trading
plans as a safe harbor from civil and criminal liability. See infra Section V for an explanation of this
argument.
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and then litigate the statutory authority for 10b5-1(b) to test the theory.
III. CHALLENGES AND COSTS OF INSIDER TRADING COMPLIANCE
This Article has demonstrated that to avoid treble damages under ITSFEA
and criminal liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, firms must implement
strong compliance policies designed to prevent insider trading. But it has also
shown that in the absence of any clear legal definition of insider trading,
vagueness, uncertainty, and controversy surround the question of precisely what
conduct is proscribed by the law. This state of affairs places issuers in an
awkward position. If they do not implement effective compliance programs, they
risk serious civil, criminal, and reputational sanctions should one or more of their
employees be found guilty of insider trading. But how can issuers implement
policies to reliably prevent conduct that is not defined with any specificity?
There are a number of insider trading control mechanisms employed by
issuers; they include (1) a published ban on any trading in an issuer’s shares
based on material nonpublic information (i.e., self-policing),104 (2) requiring
preclearance for trading, 105 and (3) the imposition of “blackout periods.”106
Predictably, ambiguities in the law of insider trading create significant challenges
to designing and implementing each of these control mechanisms, and answering
these challenges translates directly into significant costs to firms.
A.

Cannot Rely on Self-Policing

Ambiguity in the law of insider trading presents serious challenges for
issuers in articulating and implementing effective self-policing plans. At a
minimum, self-policing requires educating employees by offering an everyday
language definition of the proscribed conduct.107 Once employees are educated,
the policy must then set out the nature of the controls that will be in place to
identify noncompliance and incentivize compliance.108 The obstacles to
designing and implementing such a policy for insider trading should by now be
obvious.
Again, it is generally understood that issuers’ employees violate the law
against insider trading when they seek to benefit by trading (or tipping) on the
basis of material nonpublic information in violation of some “fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence.”109 But simply parroting these words in a
written compliance policy is unhelpful without also offering definitions of its key
elements. But, as has been explained, crucial elements of this definition (e.g.,
104.
105.

See Chasin, supra note 18, at 861–62.
See BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 157; Chasin, supra note 18, at

863.
106. See BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 154–56; Chasin, supra note 18,
at 862.
107. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 827.
108. Id. at 825.
109. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1979) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 26, § 551(2)(a)).
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materiality, publicity, and mental state) remain uncertain. 110 Thus, giving
expression to these terms with sufficient specificity to guide conduct pursuant to
a written self-policing policy forces issuers to take sides in ongoing scholarly
debates, splits among circuits, and conflicting direction from the SEC and the
courts. In doing so, issuers are forced to guess, and risk guessing wrong.
Consequently, issuers who rely exclusively on self-policing policies have
three options, and none of them are good. First, an issuer can adopt a written
policy that bans employees from trading in its shares based on material
nonpublic information without defining the key terms. But this defeats the goals
of effective compliance (i.e., preventing violations while insulating the firm from
liability when violations occur) by leaving employees without a clear sense of
what conduct is proscribed. Second, an issuer can adopt a written ban on insider
trading that actually defines key terms such as “material,” “nonpublic,” and
“based on” in everyday language that can educate and guide the conduct of its
employees. But this strategy risks contradiction by the ex post interpretations of
regulators or the courts. Third, an issuer can adopt a “play-it-safe” approach by
banning all (or nearly all) trading in firm shares by employees. But this tactic is
highly inefficient (precluding vast numbers of perfectly legal trades) and would
virtually eliminate equity as a form of employee compensation.111 Thus, an
insider trading compliance policy that relies exclusively on self-policing would
either be vague and therefore unhelpful, well defined and therefore risky, or
blanket and therefore highly inefficient. The result is that, in practice, issuers
tend to adopt written policies that proscribe insider trading without defining it
with specificity,112 but they then supplement this written ban with other control
mechanisms, such as preclearance for trading and blackout periods.113
Supplementing self-policing with these control mechanisms does not resolve the
problem of insider trading compliance in the face of legal ambiguity.
B.

Challenges and Costs of Uncertainty for Preclearance

Given the uncertainties and risks associated with reliance on self-policing,
many commentators recommend that issuers adopt preclearance procedures for
employee trades.114 But preclearance is not without its own challenges. The same

110. What counts as a fiduciary duty or duty of trust and confidence is also ambiguous, but this
is less of a concern for issuers because (right or wrong) the Supreme Court has made it clear that it
recognizes the issuer and its employees as owing a fiduciary duty to shareholders.
111. Firms that adopt such play-it-safe insider trading compliance policies could still use stock
and stock options as a form of compensation, but the value of the compensation would be diminished
significantly by the fact that employees could not liquidate their shares or exercise their options until
after leaving the firm. This would also create a perverse incentive for employees to leave the firm to
diversify their portfolio—or to leave whenever the stock is performing well.
112. See Alan J. Berkeley, Form of Summary Memorandum and Sample Corporate Policy on
Insider Trading, 29 A.L.I.-A.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 49, 58–60 (2005) (offering a general
definition of insider trading along with the suggestion that, when in doubt about whether information
is “material” or “nonpublic,” employees should “assume that the information is”).
113. See BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 154–57.
114. E.g., id. at 157; Berkeley, supra note 112, at 461–62.
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ambiguities in the law that preclude effective self-policing will hinder compliance
officers in making appropriate preclearance decisions. The problem of ambiguity
in the law is then compounded by compliance officers’ limited access to facts
regarding employees’ knowledge and motives for trading. Compliance officers
are therefore required to exercise a great deal of discretion in preclearing insider
trades and, given the incentives, this often leads to inefficient results. Consider
the following scenario.
Imagine the chief financial officer (CFO) of ABC Corp. requests
preclearance for the sale of 10,000 shares of ABC stock pursuant to the
company’s compliance plan. The CFO explains that he wants to sell because he
needs cash to cover the down payment and closing costs for the purchase of a
new home. Six months prior, ABC Corp. publicly announced that its president
would be retiring and that a successor would be named soon. Two days prior to
the CFO’s preclearance request, ABC Corp. posted a press release on its website
announcing that ABC’s senior vice president of marketing would be the new
president. The news was picked up and noted by the Wall Street Journal that
same day. For years, it had been assumed by analysts that this senior vice
president would be the president’s successor. Indeed, a number of analysts had
already issued reports operating under the assumption that this senior vice
president would get the nod. These analyst reports agreed that, given the senior
vice president’s similar background and management style, the change would not
affect ABC’s operations. The stock price has remained steady since the press
release was posted.
Before clearing the CFO’s trade, the compliance officer must determine
whether it is based on material nonpublic information. Is news of the new
president’s identity “public”? As explained above, the compliance officer gets
little or no help from the statutes and rules in answering this question. Applying
the dissemination and absorption test, the compliance officer must consider
whether news of the leadership change has been disseminated through
recognized sources in a manner calculated to reach the general market.115
Indications from the SEC suggest that ABC posting the release on the
company’s website alone would not be sufficient.116 Still, publication in the Wall
Street Journal is likely to be regarded as a recognized source of distribution with
general reach. 117 But dissemination is only half the test; the compliance officer
must also determine whether the information has been absorbed (i.e., whether it
is “readily translatable into investment action”) by the investing public.118 The
answer is not obvious here. As noted above, the Ingoldsby court held that
information concerning a change in leadership had not been sufficiently
absorbed a full nine days after it was highlighted in the Wall Street Journal

115. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 145.
116. See id. at 148.
117. This conclusion is not certain. As noted above, regulators have found publication through
some subscriber-based news or wire services to be insufficient. See, e.g., Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 10174, 1973 WL 149283, at *6 (May 25, 1973).
118. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968).
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because it had not been fully digested by the relevant investing public.119
Applying the efficient market approach (i.e., trying to determine whether the
information has been impounded in the price of the stock) 120 will not help the
compliance officer here either. In this case it is impossible for the compliance
officer to know ex ante whether the information has reached a sufficient number
of traders in the active investment community for ABC shares. It is no help for
the compliance officer to look to the share price to determine whether the
information has been impounded because it has remained static. This could
reflect either that (1) the information has reached the active investment
community and was not deemed material (as prior analyst reports would
suggest), (2) it has not yet reached the active investment community (as in
Ingoldsby), or (3) its effect has been offset by other information. In the midst of
such uncertainty, and in light of the significant risks of guessing wrong, a prudent
compliance officer would likely act under the assumption that the information is
nonpublic. 121 But there remains the question of materiality.
Is news of the new president’s identity material? On the one hand, in light
of the surrounding circumstances and related analyst buzz, the compliance
officer might conclude that the new president’s identity would not be considered
important by the reasonable investor, or as altering the “total mix” of
information available, because the market had long assumed this was ABC’s
succession plan. On the other hand, the compliance officer might worry that any
change in leadership is per se important to investors. Indeed, Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Regulation FD) explicitly identifies “changes in control or in
management” as information that may be material.122 In making the materiality
determination, courts will sometimes look to the market’s reaction upon
disclosure. 123 Here, the compliance officer might look at the static price and
conclude that information regarding the change in leadership is not material. But
while price movement is a factor, courts have held it is not dispositive,124 and, as
noted above, here there may be the concern that two days has not provided
enough time for the market to absorb the information.
Moreover, the preclearance decision cannot focus exclusively on facts of
which the compliance office is aware. Given the CFO’s position, he may know of
future earnings or other financial information not available to the compliance

119. SEC v. Ingoldsby, CIV. A. No. 88–1001–MA, 1990 WL 120731, at *5 (D. Mass. May 15,
1990).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). See supra notes 81–86
and accompanying text for a discussion of the efficient market approach.
121. See Berkeley, supra note 112, at 60 (“[W]hen in doubt about whether information is nonpublic . . . assume that the information is ‘non-public’ . . . .”).
122. See August 24, 2000 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Release, supra note 59, at
51,721.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that a jump in price
from thirty dollars per share to forty-five dollars per share immediately upon public announcement of
a tender offer was an indication of materiality).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that a price
change—or lack thereof—is not dispositive of materiality).
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officer but that may nevertheless be material. The compliance officer will ask the
CFO if he is aware of any such information, but he can never be certain that the
CFO has provided an honest answer.
To complicate matters further, the CFO may not know whether he is aware
of material nonpublic information. He is no doubt privy to a great deal of soft
information about which he has formed opinions concerning the future
performance of the company, but he may not know whether such information is
sufficiently crystallized or important to count as material. As explained above,
even if the CFO is completely forthright with the compliance officer by sharing
all of the soft information that he possesses, the Basic probability-magnitude test
will likely be useless to the compliance officer in making a decision ex ante. For
example, the CFO may have learned that there is a five percent chance that one
of ABC’s leading products may have to be recalled. The magnitude is great, but
the probability is low. The Basic test provides no threshold for determining when
the product of probability and magnitude equals materiality, so the compliance
officer must guess. And, in guessing, the compliance officer recognizes that,
should the recall actually occur, a future jury will judge his decision with the
benefit of hindsight. 125 Even more concerning, the compliance officer must
consider the fact that, under Texas Gulf Sulphur and Basic, jurors may take the
mere fact that the CFO traded while in possession of this soft information as
itself “an indication of materiality.”126
Thus, as one commentator puts it, given the subtlety of the question, and
the limited information available to the compliance officer, “it may be almost
impossible for [a compliance] officer to make [a materiality] determination
empirically.”127 When in doubt, a prudent compliance officer will err on the side
of finding the information material.128
But trading by an insider is illegal only if it is done “on the basis of”
material nonpublic information, and our CFO has represented that he is trading
only because he needs cash to close on his new house. If our compliance officer
applies Rule 10b5-1(b), however, she must ignore the CFO’s stated purpose for
the sale of ABC shares and focus strictly on the question of whether he is
currently “aware” of any material nonpublic information. But, again, this places
the compliance officer in a difficult position. As noted above, it will be very
difficult for the compliance officer to determine whether the CFO is “aware” of
any material nonpublic information—either because the CFO may be untruthful
or because, without clear regulatory guidance, neither he nor the compliance
officer may be able to answer this question with any certainty. Thus, the prudent
default is to assume awareness of material nonpublic information and deny
clearance for the trade. As noted above, there are good reasons for concluding

125. See BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 67.
126. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (1968)).
127. Chasin, supra note 18, at 868.
128. See Berkeley, supra note 112, at 60 (“When in doubt about whether particular non-public
information is material, exercise caution.”).
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that the SEC exceeded its authority in adopting the mere awareness standard
under Rule 10b5-1, but, of course, the compliance officer would not put the firm
or her employment at risk to challenge the rule.
Thus, with potential firm liability and the compliance officer’s own
employment on the line, she will have every incentive to play it safe and refuse
preclearance for trades in the face of such uncertainty. This conservative
approach, however, leads to a number of adverse consequences for the firm and
its shareholders.
First, the CFO may bear ill will toward the compliance officer. Since the
CFO told the compliance officer that he is not aware of any material nonpublic
information and wishes to trade only to close on his house, then, when the trade
is not approved, the CFO may assume the compliance officer determined that he
was untruthful. Such ill will can undermine the spirit of cooperation and mutual
respect that is so important to a strong compliance culture and a strong firm. To
avoid this potential for in-house conflict, the firm may choose to shift
preclearance decisions to outside counsel, but this comes at a significant cost to
the firm and therefore the shareholders.129 At a minimum, such difficult
compliance decisions are likely to be a distraction for management, which also
affects share value.130
Second, corporate insiders typically receive a large portion of their
compensation in firm shares.131 Equity compensation holds value for insiders
only if it can be liquidated without much difficulty.132 Thus, any restrictions the
company places on its employees’ ability to monetize firm shares will devalue
them as compensation, requiring the company to offer more shares to achieve
the same remunerative effect in the future. 133 In the example above, the
compliance officer’s denial of preclearance devalued ABC shares to the CFO.
This costs ABC (and therefore its shareholders) because the CFO is now more
likely to demand a comparative increase in ABC shares (or cash) in his next
negotiation of compensation.134

129. Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1180–82 (noting that the costs to a firm and
its shareholders in turning to outside counsel to make compliance decisions are increased by ambiguity
in the law).
130. Id. at 1177–80 (noting that vagueness in insider trading law distracts management from
focusing on business and operations, which negatively impacts stockholder value).
131. M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508 (2011)
(reporting that between 1999 and 2008, “the average public company executive earned more than half
her total pay in the form of stock options or restricted stock”).
132. See id. at 509 (noting that restrictions on the ability to liquidate shares “reduce the value of
the shares granted”); see also Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 10b5-1
Plans, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 67 (2009) (“To enjoy the proceeds of selling stock issued as
compensation, the executive must be able to liquidate stock while in possession of inside
information.”).
133. See Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 375; Henderson, supra note 131, at 509–10
(noting that when the insiders cannot trade without restrictions, the value of the shares is reduced,
which causes an “increase [in] the amount of shares necessary to achieve the same incentive effects”).
134. See Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1174–77 (contending that vagueness in
the law leads to delayed or foregone transactions).
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Third, in part because equity has become a leading component of corporate
compensation packages, 135 insider ownership typically accounts for a large
proportion of a given issuer’s outstanding shares. As Professor Jesse Fried points
out, “Although U.S. firms are commonly thought to have relatively diffuse
ownership, average insider ownership in publicly-traded firms is . . . surprisingly
high.” 136 Professor Fried cites to one study suggesting that directors and officers
own an average of twenty-four to thirty-two percent of a given firm’s equity.137
This figure excludes insiders’ stock options, “which would further increase their
effective equity ownership.”138 With so many shares in the hands of insiders, it
stands to reason that significant restrictions on their trading would decrease
liquidity in a firm’s shares. This, in turn, increases a firm’s cost of capital.139
Finally, in addition to risking ill will and increasing the costs of
compensation and capital, too conservative a position on preclearance may
expose a company to liability for breach of good faith and fair dealing in its
negotiation of employment agreements. No federal law expressly empowers
issuers to restrict trading activity by insiders. 140 Consequently, issuers typically
bargain for these restraints in employment contracts, which include trading
policies.141 But, unless an issuer details the precise parameters of insider trading
restrictions in advance (say, in the compliance policy), an insider-employee can
challenge a compliance officer’s conservative preclearance strategy as devaluing
his shares in a way not contemplated by the parties ex ante.142
Of course, a compliance officer could avoid these costs by adopting a liberal
approach to preclearance, but, in light of the ambiguities in the law outlined
above, she would thereby risk exposing the company to civil and criminal insider
trading liability. There appear to be no good options for an effective
preclearance strategy under the current insider trading regime.
C.

Challenges and Costs of Uncertainty for Blackout Periods

Another insider trading compliance strategy for issuers is the
implementation of “blackout periods” in lieu of (or in addition to) a
preclearance program. 143 A blackout period is a date range within which issuers
preclude their officers and directors from trading in a corporation’s shares.144 A
135. Henderson, supra note 131, at 508.
136. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 804 (2014).
137. Id.; see also Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1382–83 (2009) (summarizing findings from multiple studies on director and
officer corporate ownership).
138. Fried, supra note 136, at 804 n.11.
139. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN.
ECON. 223, 249 (1986) (explaining that the greater the liquidity of a security, the lower the expected
return required by investors, which decreases the firm’s cost of capital).
140. Chasin, supra note 18, at 861.
141. Id. at 861–62 (describing the insider-employee bargaining process).
142. See id. at 865.
143. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 897.
144. Id.
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“trading window” is a period during which relevant employees are permitted to
trade (i.e., it is the flipside of the coin to a blackout period).145 The duration of
blackout periods will vary from issuer to issuer, and they are not always fixed.
For example, many issuers impose regular blackout periods around the quarterly
disclosure process (e.g., beginning three or four weeks prior to scheduled
disclosure and ending forty-eight hours after filing).146 It is assumed that such
blackout periods will cover the time period during which officers and directors
are most likely to have access to material nonpublic information. As one
commentator puts it, “[B]ecause of the substantial and wide-ranging disclosures
required in these reports . . . there is a relatively low probability that an insider
who trades during the time immediately following their dissemination will be
deemed to have traded on material nonpublic information.” 147 But firms do not
always limit blackout periods to disclosure seasons; they will often close an
otherwise open trading window if new material information arises (e.g., of a
proposed merger or acquisition) that is not yet ripe for disclosure. 148
The SEC has not prescribed set blackout periods or trading windows,149 so
they are typically set by issuers on the advice of counsel or at the discretion of
compliance officers. 150 In the midst of the legal ambiguity in the law of insider
trading detailed above, however, the exercise of discretion in setting trading
windows and blackout periods creates many of the same problems and runs
many of the same risks as preclearance.
Again, in addition to regular blackout periods around quarterly filings,
compliance officers will close otherwise open trading windows when employees
become aware of material nonpublic information concerning a company.151 But,
as one commentator notes, “[a]n issuer always has undisclosed information
about numerous different aspects of its business,” and “[b]y the time all of that
information has been disseminated publicly . . . new undisclosed information
doubtless will have been developed.”152 So, just as with the preclearance
decision, there will never be a time when compliance officers can be certain
insiders do not possess material nonpublic information. This is particularly true
in light of ambiguity in the law and the reality that their ex ante materiality and
publicity determinations will be judged by regulators, prosecutors, and jurors ex
post, and with the benefit of hindsight.
This leaves compliance officers or corporate counsel making blackout
period decisions with the same bad choices they faced under the preclearance
program. They can adopt a conservative strategy and extend blackout periods to

145. Robert A. Barron, Some Comments on the Pre-Clearance Procedure, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 383,
387–88 (2009) (using the coin analogy).
146. E.g., id. at 383.
147. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 155.
148. Id.
149. Barron, supra note 145, at 387.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Chasin, supra note 18, at 863.
152. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 154.
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all but a few small trading windows immediately following quarterly filings. But
such a restrictive blackout policy will decrease the value of shares issued by a
firm as compensation to employees by limiting their liquidity. 153 Again, this
means firms will have to issue more shares to achieve the same remunerative
effect, at great cost to their existing shareholders.154 In addition, as with
preclearance, implementing so conservative a policy might affect a firm’s cost of
capital (by decreasing liquidity), 155 and it may expose the company to liability for
breaching its contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to its
employees. 156 Finally, implementing extended blackout windows will force
insiders to make large trades in short, periodic spurts, which will have an
unnatural impact on the price and trading volume of those shares.157 Such
concentrated trading may attract unwarranted (and therefore misleading)
market attention.158
The alternative for firms, however, is no better. By adopting a more liberal
approach and limiting the imposition of blackout periods to only rare
circumstances in which there is widespread knowledge of market-moving,
material nonpublic information (say, in the midst of merger or tender offer
negotiations), a compliance officer risks exposing a company to significant
liability. 159
Ultimately, as with self-policing and preclearance, ambiguity in the law of
insider trading leaves a conscientious compliance officer with few good options
in designing and implementing an effective trading window policy.
IV. THE PARADOX
To take stock, vagueness in the law translates into uncertainty for issuers in
the design and implementation of their insider trading compliance programs.
This uncertainty, when combined with the threat of significant reputational and
economic sanctions for “ineffective” compliance programs, typically leads firms
to adopt a “play-it-safe” approach. Issuers design and implement compliance
regimes that are marked by highly restrictive preclearance decision making and
extended blackout periods.
But stingy preclearance and lengthy blackout periods come at a heavy price
153. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 355 (stating restrictions on shares diminish their
value); Henderson, supra note 131, at 509–10 (noting that insiders value the opportunity to trade
without limitation).
154. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 375; Henderson, supra note 131, at 509.
155. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the devaluing effect of
restrictive policies.
156. See, e.g., Chasin, supra note 18, at 863.
157. See Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, Insider Trading Under Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, in
POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, SH013 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 893, 901 (2002)
(“Open market sales by [insiders] . . . often attract unwanted attention, due to the perception of many
investors that such sales may reflect a lack of confidence in the company.”).
158. Id.
159. See supra Section I for a discussion of the potential criminal and civil penalties for firms
with weak or ineffective compliance programs.
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to firms in terms of corporate culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, cost
of capital, and risk of contractual liability to employees. If an issuer is rational,
the magnitude of such inefficiencies will be a direct function of the ambiguity in
the law (which is great) and the severity of the sanctions for violation (which are
stiff). This is the paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers: ambiguity in
the law combined with the threat of stiff reputational and legal sanctions creates
a perverse incentive to adopt compliance programs that are highly inefficient and
ultimately costly to shareholders.160 Thus, ironically, the very insider trading
regulations that were implemented to increase value for shareholders appear to
be having the opposite effect.
The SEC has not been blind to this paradox, and in 2000 it adopted Rule
10b5-1(c) in an attempt (albeit unsuccessfully) to address it.
V.

10b5-1(C) TRADING PLANS: JUST MORE UNCERTAINTY

Rule 10b5-1(c) provides, inter alia, that an affirmative defense to insider
trading is available to those who trade company shares through a qualified
trading plan (“Trading Plan” or “Plan”).161 To qualify, a Plan must be written162
and it must specify the amount, price, and date of the securities to be purchased
or sold,163 or it must include “a written formula or algorithm” that determines
the Plan transactions.164 A qualifying Plan must have been entered into while the
insider was unaware of material nonpublic information, and the insider is not
permitted to have any subsequent influence “over how, when, or whether to
effect [Plan] purchases or sales.”165 Finally, a Trading Plan provides an
affirmative defense to insider trading liability only when it was “entered into in
good faith.” 166
According to Linda Chatman Thomsen, former Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement, part of the rationale for adopting 10b5-1(c) Trading
Plans was “to give executives opportunities to diversify or become more liquid
through the use of plans with prearranged trades without facing the prospect of
an insider trading investigation.”167 In other words, the SEC implicitly admitted

160. See Heminway, A Call for Action, supra note 6, at 1174 (noting that lack of clarity creates
additional transactional costs without a resulting benefit); Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 6, at 1012
(arguing that “[v]agueness” in insider trading law may raise “economic efficiency concerns”).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3) (2016).
162. Id.; see also Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 351 n.9 (explaining how the written
requirement differentiates this affirmative defense from others in the rule).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1).
164. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2).
165. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3).
166. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii).
167. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening
Remarks
Before
the
15th
Annual
NASPP
Conference
(Oct.
10,
2007),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm [hereinafter Thomsen, NASPP Conference
Remarks]; see also Henderson, supra note 131, at 516–17 (noting that regulators expect the Plans to
increase opportunities for optimization trading and potentially decrease the value of informed
trading).

2016]

SOLVING THE PARADOX OF INSIDER TRADING COMPLIANCE

297

what was argued above, that its preferred knowing possession test (now reflected
in the strict awareness test under 10b5-1(b)) made it virtually impossible for
insiders to trade without the risk of liability outside of these Plans. 168 As one
commentator put it, “[p]rior to the adoption of [Trading Plans], the insider
trading laws provided no means of assuring that a transaction in the company’s
securities by an insider would escape liability under these laws,” which placed
compliance officers in a serious “predicament.”169 Once Trading Plans became
available, firms immediately began availing themselves of them. Indeed, since
the adoption of Rule 10b5-1(c) in 2000, the use of Trading Plans by corporate
insiders has become pervasive, accounting for billions of dollars of trading each
year.170 Yet despite the SEC’s intentions, Trading Plans have not resolved the
paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers.
To begin, 10b5-1(c)’s requirement that Trading Plans be entered into at a
time when insiders are not aware of material nonpublic information leaves
compliance officers in much the same position they were in prior to the adoption
of the rule. Without the aid of clear statutory or regulatory guidance, they still
must determine whether an insider is aware of material nonpublic information at
the time the Plan is adopted. In other words, compliance officers’ “predicament”
of authorizing insider trades in the face of legal and factual uncertainty 171 is
simply pushed back to the date of a Trading Plan’s adoption, rather than the date
of a trade. To make matters worse, the regulatory scrutiny of this decision has
increased exponentially in light of recent studies reflecting that insiders are using
Trading Plans to beat the market.172
In August 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported the initial results of a study
by Professor Alan Jagolinzer reflecting that insiders using Trading Plans were
beating the market on average by 5.6 percentage points.173 Professor Jagolinzer’s
subsequently published article explains that Trading Plan participants’ stock
sales “tend to follow price increases and precede price declines.”174 Moreover,
the study shows that Trading Plan initiations (which usually include sell orders)
“are associated with subsequent adverse news disclosure and that early [Trading
168. As one commentator put it, “[I]f executives [did] not have access to the 10b5-1 plans, they
[would] never be able to sell their stock.” Sougata Mukherjee, The Dangerous Game Corporate
Executives Are Playing, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
triangle/blog/2012/12/the-dangerous-game-corporate.html.
169. Donald H. Meiers, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: A Win-Win Situation, 9 METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., no. 5, May 10, 2001, 2001 WLNR 12908239.
170. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044410040457764
1463717344178 (quoting Professor Alan Jagolinzer, University of Colorado Boulder).
171. See supra Sections III and IV for a discussion of the challenges of corporate compliance
and the resulting costs to shareholders.
172. See, e.g., Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI.
224, 226–27 (2009) (providing an analysis of insiders’ abnormal returns while using Trading Plans).
173. Tony Cooke & Serena Ng, Moving the Market—Tracking the Numbers/Street Sleuth:
Insiders Prosper Despite SEC Rule; Even with Planned Trades, Executives Still Can Beat Overall
Market Performance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2005, at C3.
174. Jagolinzer, supra note 172, at 224.
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Plan] termination is associated with positive firm performance.”175 From these
results, Professor Jagolinzer concludes that insiders are using Trading Plans to
trade “strategically.” 176 In November 2012, the Wall Street Journal followed up
with its own study suggesting the strategic use of Trading Plans by insiders.177 It
found that while 1,418 of executives who traded in their own company’s shares
during the period of the study recorded average gains (or avoided average
losses) of ten percent, only half that number recorded losses of ten percent or
more.178
These studies have led to increased media scrutiny of Trading Plans and
calls for the SEC to address the issue.179 It is likely the SEC will respond to this
pressure with a rule change imposing greater restrictions on Plan use.180 Indeed
the Wall Street Journal quoted a fund manager stating that he would be
“shocked” if the SEC does not reform 10b5-1 to prevent the strategic use of
Trading Plans by insiders.181 And as firms wait for the SEC’s next move to
address this controversy over Trading Plans, SEC staff comments and guidance
on this issue have only clouded Trading Plan use in increased uncertainty.
For example, the chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance
has stated that he would “love to catch” an insider abusing Trading Plans “and
use him as an example.”182 He added that the SEC is “looking for [a] big
[Trading Plan] case[] to send a message.”183 But while the SEC has made it clear
that it is after insiders who are using Trading Plans “for cover”184 while they
trade on material nonpublic information, as one commentator notes, the SEC
has not explained “how such conduct violate[s] the law or under what
circumstances an affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1 would not be
available.”185
Many suggest that one of the principal means of manipulating Trading Plans
to beat the market is early termination.186 The SEC has affirmed that, ceteris
175. Id.
176. Id. at 225–26.
177. Pulliam & Barry, supra note 170.
178. Id.
179. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 340 n.6 (citing a number of Wall Street Journal
articles questioning the legitimacy of Trading Plan use).
180. See id. at 388–89.
181. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans Under Fire: Despite 2007 Warning, Experts
Say Loopholes Remain for Corporate Insiders, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2012, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324296604578177734024394950.
182. Yin Wilczek, No Conclusion on 10b5-1 Plans, but SEC Monitoring Situation, Official Says,
SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 18 2013, 9:15 PM), www.bloomberglaw.com/s/news/2d7316f12bf2b30c45
edb8a7e04297b1/document/MLHA5C3H65TU?headlineOnly=false&highlight=Yin+Wilczek (quoting
Thomas Kim).
183. Id.
184. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
2007 Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807lct
2.htm.
185. Horwich, supra note 102, at 951 n.181.
186. E.g., Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 365 (“If the information does not pan out
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paribus, the act of terminating an existing Trading Plan while aware of material
nonpublic information does not violate securities laws because it does not
involve the sale or purchase of a security.187 The power to terminate a Plan
based on material nonpublic information effectively “allows insiders to create a
cost-free option to buy or sell” a company’s shares.188 And studies indicate that
insiders are indeed using early plan terminations strategically. For example, one
study reflects that forty-six percent of sampled Plan terminations “preced[ed]
positive news events” for the company, while only eleven percent “preced[ed]
negative (ambiguous) news events.”189 Technically, strategic early Plan
terminations exploit a “loophole” in Rule 10b5-1(c) and therefore remain within
the letter of the law.190 Nevertheless, the SEC has issued vague threats 191 and
ambiguous guidance insisting its enforcement arm can reach this conduct. 192 For
example, the SEC qualified its approval of early Plan terminations by warning
that (1) such terminations may deprive an insider of the affirmative defense for
prior transactions under the Plan,193 and (2) frequent early terminations may
raise concerns over whether an insider established a new Plan in good faith. 194
This guidance is subject to multiple interpretations, but the gist seems to be that
if an insider engages in frequent or otherwise suspicious Plan terminations, the
SEC may conclude either that the Plan was never qualified because the insider
had material nonpublic information at adoption, or that the insider was using
as expected, the insider may just terminate the plan. In effect, the ability to terminate Trading Plans
based on material nonpublic information allows insiders to create a cost-free option to buy or sell.”);
Cooke & Ng, supra note 173, at C3 (“I just think [selective termination is] such a major loophole in
terms of that particular rule . . . . [It allows insiders to] get rid of the bad trades and keep what look
like the good trades.” (quoting Associate Professor Constance Bagley, Harvard Business School)); see
also Horwich, supra note 101, at 951 (“It is not a violation of Rule 10b-5 for someone who has
established a Plan to terminate the Plan to abort a sale that would have taken place pursuant to the
Plan at a disadvantageous price, when the person who created the Plan has come to know that there
are undisclosed material positive developments at the company that would likely cause the price of the
stock to increase after the Plan sale.”); Jagolinzer, supra note 172, at 227 (“Finally, the SEC allows
participants to terminate plans before events or changes in firm performance that might negatively
affect their trade returns.”); Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders’ Incentive to
Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 329–30 (2010) (asserting that there is a loophole by which an
individual may terminate the plan at any time).
187. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Exchange Act
Rules, Question 120.27 (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchangeact
rules-interps.htm [hereinafter Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations].
188. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 365; see also Veliotis, supra note 186, at 329
(noting that selective termination gives insiders an option to use insider information to trade).
189. Jagolinzer, supra note 172, at 235.
190. This author has argued elsewhere that the strategic termination loophole was unavoidable
for the SEC in effecting a compromise in the “use versus possession” debate. See Anderson, A Sea
Change, supra note 96, at 365.
191. See, e.g., Thomsen, NASPP Conference Remarks, supra note 167; Wilczek, supra note 182
(stating that the SEC is taking a hard look at the possibility that plans are being abused).
192. See, e.g., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, supra note 187, at 120.18, 120.19
(discussing the various ways termination could affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense).
193. Id. at 120.18.
194. Id. at 120.19.
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early Plan termination “as part of a plan or scheme” to evade the spirit (if not
the letter) of 10b-5.195
But, from the standpoint of insider trading compliance, the problem is that
the SEC and the courts often seem to have very different ideas of what the
“spirit” of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is.196 This fact was most recently
illustrated by the Second Circuit’s rejection of the SEC’s favored theory of
insider trading tippee liability in United States v. Newman.197 With the SEC and
the courts often far apart concerning the purpose and scope of section 10(b)
insider trading liability, it is no help to suggest that compliance officers approve
only those Trading Plans that are consistent with the spirit of the law. Instead,
conscientious compliance officers will be forced to adopt a conservative
approach to Trading Plan adoptions,198 just as they are with preclearance and
blackout periods.199 But, for the same reasons outlined above,200 taking a
conservative approach to Trading Plans threatens to undermine their usefulness
to firms in improving the liquidity of company shares offered to employees as
compensation.201 In other words, the SEC’s qualifications to 10b5-1(c) may well
undermine its very purpose, which was to provide some relief to firms in
implementing workable insider trading compliance regimes. In sum, the
adoption of Trading Plans as an affirmative defense to insider trading liability
has done little if anything to address the paradox of insider trading compliance.
VI. IT’S NOT WORTH IT
This Article has established that vagueness in the law of insider trading
leads to uncertainty concerning its scope. Compliance officers can rarely be
certain that a trade is permitted in advance. When such uncertainty is considered
alongside the market stigma and costs of any SEC investigation (regardless of its
ultimate findings) and the extreme penalties an issuer may incur if found civilly
or criminally liable, firms typically adopt a hyperconservative approach to insider
trading compliance. This Article has argued, however, that adopting such a playit-safe approach to insider trading compliance results in significant inefficiencies.
These inefficiencies directly affect the bottom line for firms and their
shareholders. This, again, is the paradox of insider trading compliance for
195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) (2016).
196. See Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 368–71.
197. 773 F.3d 438, 442–43 (2d Cir. 2014).
198. For example, one commentator suggests that firms follow a “keep it simple, stupid”
approach. Boris Feldman, The Best-Laid Plans of 10b5-1, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/06/the-bestlaid-plans-of-10b5-1/. Firms should initiate Trading Plans “48 or 72 hours after the earnings release”
and should skip a quarter until they are given effect. Id. Under this conservative approach,
“modification” and “termination” are “two four-letter words in the world of 10b5-1 plans. Neither is
prohibited, but both should be avoided.” Id.
199. Berkeley, supra note 112, at 55–56.
200. See supra Part III.C and Section IV for a discussion of the liquidity problems associated
with conservative approaches.
201. See Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 358 n.150.
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issuers.
The following question must therefore be addressed: Does the current
insider trading enforcement regime, which forces these difficult and costly
compliance decisions on firms, do more harm than good to their shareholders?
After all, insider trading laws are presumably designed to protect a firm’s
shareholders and market participants in general. If the costs of insider trading
compliance to issuers (combined with the costs of enforcement and
criminalization to society writ large) outweigh the benefits, then reform is
needed. The literature is replete with research weighing the costs of insider
trading,202 but the costs of compliance are rarely factored into the equation.
In what follows, this Article argues that when the paradox of insider trading
compliance for issuers is weighed alongside other moral and economic
considerations, it becomes clear that reform is needed. In reaching this
conclusion, however, a solution also emerges. This Article argues that the
paradox of insider trading compliance can be resolved by reforming the current
insider trading enforcement regime to expressly permit “issuer-licensed” insider
trading.203 Such reform will also result in a more rational, efficient, and just
insider trading enforcement regime.
A.

Distinguishing Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading

When weighing the appropriateness of insider trading enforcement through
the lens of the paradox of insider trading compliance, it is helpful to posit a
counterfactual regime that does not regulate insider trading of any form. The
idea is to ask ourselves: If we did not have an insider trading enforcement regime
in place, would we find the necessity of implementing one? If we did not first
posit the absence of regulation, then this exercise would be inherently questionbegging because the risk of sanctions under the regulatory regime and the
trading expectations of others would always give participants an economic and
moral incentive for compliance, even if all agree that they would be better off
had the scheme never been adopted.204 The mere existence of a regulatory
regime cannot serve as its principal justification.
In addition to positing a laissez-faire insider trading regime, the following
analysis focuses on a specific subclass of insider trading, issuer-licensed insider
trading.205 Issuer-licensed insider trading occurs where the insider “trades on
material nonpublic information [with the firm’s approval]” 206 and where “the
202. E.g., John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–17 [hereinafter Anderson, Greed, Envy].
203. See infra Part VI.A for a definition of the term “issuer-licensed.” See also John P.
Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795, 797–802
(2015) [hereinafter Anderson, What’s the Harm] (explaining why issuer-licensed insider trading should
not be criminalized).
204. E.g., Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 37.
205. For other scholarship discussing issuer-licensed insider trading, see Anderson, A Sea
Change, supra note 96, at 379–82; Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 28; and Anderson,
What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 787–802.
206. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 379 (alteration in original).
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issuer’s policy allowing insider trading is disclosed to the investing public.”207
Issuer-licensed insider trading must be distinguished from two other forms
of trading, “issuer-proscribed” insider trading and trading based on
misappropriated information.208 Issuer-proscribed insider trading occurs where
an insider trades (or tips others who trade) based “on material nonpublic
information [despite the fact that] the insider has promised—or otherwise
undertaken pursuant to company policy [express or implied]—not to trade on
such information.”209 Misappropriation trading occurs where a corporate
outsider improperly obtains material nonpublic information in violation of some
duty of trust or confidence and, unbeknownst to the source, seeks to benefit by
trading (or tipping others who trade) on the information. 210
One reason issuer-licensed insider trading supplies the focus here is that
neither misappropriation nor issuer-proscribed insider trading contributes to the
paradox of compliance outlined above. Misappropriation trading, by definition,
does not address firm insiders. As for issuer-proscribed insider trading, the
paradox dissolves with the understanding that the interests of firms and
regulators will always be in concert. In other words, since the issuer has, for its
own reasons, independently sought a promise from its employee(s) not to trade,
external enforcement of that promise by the state would, all things being equal,
always promote the firm’s recognized interests. There would be no quandary for
the compliance officer because the firm, not some regulatory rule or principle,
determines the impermissibility of the trading.
Moreover, the moral and other social costs of both issuer-proscribed insider
trading and misappropriation trading clearly outweigh any potential benefits.
This is because both misappropriation trading and issuer-proscribed insider
trading violate a promise to a firm (or a source) not to trade on the firm’s (or
source’s) material nonpublic information. In both cases, the deception not only
risks significant harm to the promisee (otherwise it would not have sought the
promise not to trade), 211 but it also involves an injustice that may warrant civil or
criminal sanction independent of any direct economic harm to the promisee.212
In sum, return to the question posed above: If we did not have an insider

207. Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 798.
208. The current insider trading jurisprudence has divided insider trading liability under section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) into two broad theories:
the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–53
(1997). Under the classical theory, a corporate insider incurs liability by seeking to benefit from
trading (or tipping off others who trade) in shares of her own company based on material nonpublic
information. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). Both issuer-licensed and issuerproscribed insider trading as defined here would fall under the classical theory of insider trading. See
Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 796–97.
209. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 379 (second alteration in original).
210.
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (explaining the premise of liability under the
misappropriation theory).
211. See Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 800–01; see also Anderson, Greed,
Envy, supra note 202, at 27–36 (discussing the moral implications of insider trading).
212. See Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 27–36.
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trading enforcement regime in place, would we find the necessity of
implementing one? Concerning issuer-proscribed and misappropriation trading,
the answer is yes. The balance of reasons dictates that if issuer-proscribed and
misappropriation trading were not regulated, then firms, shareholders, and
indeed justice would demand that regulation be imposed. And this conclusion
would be unaffected by the paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers.
The opposite is true when the focus shifts to issuer-licensed insider trading.
B.

No Economic Harm or Moral Wrong in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading

To begin, as explained above, where insider trading is proscribed by issuers,
the regulators’ and issuers’ interests are clearly aligned, and the costs of
compliance to the issuers are costs they would presumably incur in any event.
There is the risk of divergence only where an issuer would license an insider’s
trading but for the regulation. The paradox of insider trading compliance
outlined above illustrates the potential costs of this divergence, which are only
amplified by vague and ambiguous enforcement rules and principles. Such
divergence could nevertheless be justified if there were reasons for concluding
that even issuer-licensed insider trading results in net economic harm or is
otherwise morally wrong. But this is not the case.
Unlike issuer-proscribed or misappropriation trading, issuer-licensed insider
trading does not involve the violation of a commitment not to trade. Quite the
opposite is true. Presumably insider trading would be licensed by an issuer only
in those circumstances where it is determined that such trading would result in a
net benefit to the firm; otherwise, why would the firm permit it? 213 Moreover,
where an issuer expressly permits an insider to trade, such trading does not
violate a moral duty to the firm because no promise is broken. 214 Finally, many
have claimed that, independent of any economic arguments, insider trading is
deceptive and unfair to other traders because insider trades are based on an
information advantage counterparties cannot overcome.215 But issuer-licensed
insider trading is not susceptible to this charge. For, where a firm approves an
insider’s use of material nonpublic information and publicly announces that it is
213. Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 799. See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen
Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313 (2002) (explaining the advantages of
allowing firms to control informed trading decisions). It is, of course, possible that the interests of
individual members of management (e.g., those approving or rejecting the trade requests) and the firm
may sometimes diverge. But such divergence, if it persists, will always be corrected by other selfinterested members of management whose advancement is tied to the success of the firm. Moreover,
under the model proposed below, not only must each trade be formally reviewed and approved, the
profits from that trade must also be publicly disclosed by the firm.
214. Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 36–37.
215. E.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 235–40 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (arguing that insider trading amounts to
cheating); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 375, 412 (1999) (arguing that any time someone trades on illegitimately acquired material
nonpublic information, she cheats her counterparty who does not have access to that information);
Patricia H. Werhane, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 841, 843–44 (1989) (identifying
lack of “equal access to information” as a basis for categorizing insider trading as immoral).
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doing so, there is no deception and no unfairness.216 The investing public is fully
aware that there may be insiders with an information advantage on the other
side of any transaction in the company’s shares. The public is therefore free to
either refuse to trade in that firm’s stock, or to demand a lower price for it.217
Another harm commonly attributed to insider trading is that it shakes
confidence in the markets.218 But there is something question-begging about this
claim when applied to issuer-licensed insider trading. Issuer-licensed insider
trading should shake confidence in the markets only if it can be shown on
balance to impose some independent harm or wrong on firms, shareholders, or
traders. If, as has been suggested here, there is no such harm or wrong, then
there are no grounds for thinking that even widespread issuer-licensed insider
trading would shake confidence in the markets. 219
In sum, the principal economic and moral justifications for regulating issuerproscribed and misappropriation trading do not apply to issuer-licensed insider
trading. As a result, if issuer-licensed insider trading were regulated, then any
costs of compliance with such regulation would result in a net loss to the firm and
its shareholders. On top of this, the costs to society of civil and criminal
enforcement of these regulations must be considered.
C.

Costs of Enforcement

A common justification for resisting further statutory or regulatory
certainty in the law of insider trading is that such clarity comes at the expense of
flexibility in enforcement.220 The concern is that bright-line rules would tie the
hands of regulators in confronting new and creative forms of insider trading.221 It
216. See Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 36–40.
217. See Prakash, supra note 5, at 1515–20 (stating that disclosure of general intent to allow
trading on the firm’s material, nonpublic information is sufficient to avoid deception); see also
Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 36–40 (discussing immorality in the context of insider
trading); Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 795 (asserting that the “Law of Conservation
of Securities [and other moral criticisms are] not helpful to answering the moral question of whether
insider trading is a victimless crime because it either proves too much or too little”).
218. E.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although informational
disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital
in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”);
see also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979) (“If the market is thought to be systematically
populated with such transactors some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will
incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable
informational advantages. None of those responses is socially useful.”); Homer Kripke, Manne’s
Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 954 (1985)
(“Such trading runs the risk of destroying an important public interest, namely, confidence in the
national securities markets.”).
219. See Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 41–42 (characterizing concerns that public
attitudes regarding the unfairness of nonpromissory insider trading would undermine markets as
unfounded).
220. See, e.g., Heminway, Just Do It!, supra note 6, at 1001–02.
221. Id. at 1011–12 (stating that SEC flexibility around key regulatory terms allows enforcement
agents to mold strategies to new, unforeseen situations).
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is true that increased clarity in the law would limit the discretion of regulators
and prosecutors, but such flexibility is not without its own costs. First, as a matter
of justice, that discretion may sometimes be exercised to prosecute innocent
conduct or conduct not contemplated by the authorizing statute.222 The timehonored principle of legality, “[n]ullum crimen sine lege, [demands] that there
must be no crime or punishment except in accordance with fixed, reasonably
specific, and fairly ascertainable preestablished law.”223 As Judge Barrington
Parker explained in his pointed statement addressing the government’s
“amorphous theory” of insider trading liability in Newman, “Your theory leaves
all these institutions at the mercy of the government.” 224 Second, as
demonstrated above, flexibility in enforcement imposes costs of uncertainty on
those who are regulated. But setting aside the moral and economic implications
of enforcement amidst legal uncertainty, there are more straightforward costs
that are associated with the regulation of issuer-licensed insider trading.225
In addition to the costs of compliance and government-imposed sanctions
incurred on a finding of liability, 226 there are the significant costs of legal defense
against civil or criminal investigations. These costs are incurred even if the
trading is ultimately proved innocent. 227 Moreover, the targets of even baseless
insider trading investigations will suffer from social and market stigma.228 More
still, devoting government resources to monitoring issuer-licensed insider trading
imposes costs on society in terms of tax dollars spent investigating and
prosecuting that conduct,229 and in terms of law enforcement resources diverted

222. E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“Where the legislature fails to provide
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))); see also, Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, at 371–78
(asserting that the current law is insufficient to address the problem of insider trading).
223. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 195 (1977).
224. See Nate Raymond, U.S. Prosecutor Grilled over Insider Trading Definition in Key Appeal,
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2014, 3:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/insidertrading-appealidUSL2N0NE0OR20140422 (quoting U.S. Circuit Judge Barrington Parker).
225. See supra Section III.
226. See supra Sections I and III.
227. See Nelson Obus, Refusing to Buckle to SEC Intimidation, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2014, 7:37
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nelson-obus-refusing-to-buckle-to-sec-intimidation-1403651178
(“We chose to fight. It took 12 years and $12 million, but we won.”).
228. See id. (“Our names were finally cleared. But the victory was not without cost, beyond the
millions of dollars in legal fees. The price also was inordinate amounts of time and distraction, and
untold opportunity cost to our business.”).
229. See Diane Del Guercio, Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready, The Deterrence
Effect of SEC Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading: Evidence from Run-up Before News
Events 1 n.1 (Oct. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784528 (“In 2014, the
SEC dedicated $456 million and 1373 staff to the Enforcement Division. This does not count resources
devoted to other divisions within the SEC or to enforcement by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices of the
Department of Justice.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of
Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 230, 258–61 (2007) (offering comparative figures on enforcement
inputs).
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from the enforcement of laws that actually protect the public from harm.230
Finally, scholars have suggested that there are a number of benefits that
flow to the firm and markets from issuer-licensed insider trading that are denied
to the investing public by its regulation.231 For example, most agree that insider
trading moves a stock price to better reflect the true value of a company in light
of nonpublic information. 232 It has also been suggested that insider trading has a
“market smoothing effect.”233 Insider trading typically results in a gentle price
slope leading up to the disclosure of material nonpublic information. 234 Such
trading therefore acts as “a stabilizing force” on the market by mitigating radical
price shifts that would otherwise occur upon release of material information.235
In addition, Professor Henry Manne famously argues that insider trading serves
as an effective form of corporate compensation that encourages
entrepreneurship at little or no cost to shareholders.236
D.

The Problem of Adverse Selection

Are there any benefits to criminalizing issuer-licensed insider trading not
considered thus far? Many scholars have suggested that all strategic insider
trading harms firms because it increases their cost of capital by forcing market
makers 237 to increase their bid-ask spread238 to account for the problem of

230. Henry G. Manne, Busting Insider Trading: As Pointless as Prohibition, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
28, 2014, 7:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579516170211639290.
231. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW, supra note 46, at 176–89; Anderson,
Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 14–17.
232. E.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 868 (1983) (asserting that insider trading will move the share price of a stock “closer to
what it would have been had the information been disclosed”); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and
Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933, 935 (1985) (“[N]o economist has ever denied . . .
that insider trading will always push stock prices in the ‘correct’ direction.”).
233. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 574
(1970) [hereinafter Manne, Law Professors].
234. Anderson, Greed, Envy, supra note 202, at 15.
235. Id.
236.
Henry G. Manne, Entrepreneurship, Compensation, and the Corporation, 14 Q.J.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 3, 16–18 (2011). According to Professor Manne,
If any service presently being purchased by the corporation is compensated more highly,
more of that service will be offered. Valuable information is an economic good that can be
substituted for other media in which the higher compensation can be paid. If the service
performed is or can be one which gives access to valuable information, less of other forms of
compensation must be paid in order to secure the same amount of the service.
Manne, Law Professors, supra note 233, at 579; see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 232, at 861–66
(arguing that insider trading is an efficient form of compensation based on the Coase theorem).
237. Market makers are securities dealers who provide market liquidity for a company’s shares
by standing ready to step in and transact where buy and sell orders for a security fail to achieve
equilibrium. Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of
Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2004).
238. The market maker’s bid-ask spread is the difference in the prices at which she will buy and
sell a given security. Id. It represents the “price of immediacy” and the cost of illiquidity in the market
for a company’s shares. Id. at 89.
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“adverse selection.”239 A market maker’s role is to maintain liquidity for a
company’s shares by trading from its own inventory to adjust for order
imbalances.240 Where insider trading is prevalent, market makers “bear[] the risk
of consistently buying ‘high’ from and selling ‘low’ to insiders” when correcting
for these imbalances.241 To adjust for this risk, market makers must increase the
bid-ask spread.242 But this increase in the spread operates as a “tax” on all
investors, not just insiders.243
The significance of the impact of insider trading on the bid-ask spread has
been disputed.244 For example, some have suggested that even if insider trading
were entirely eliminated, the problem of adverse selection would persist because
there will always be some traders (such as brokers and analysts) who are better
informed than the market makers.245 But, in any event, recall that only issuerlicensed insider trading is being considered here. It is hard to imagine a firm
would authorize its employees to trade on the firm’s material nonpublic
information unless such trading would benefit the firm. If licensing insider
trading would result in a net harm to a firm and its shareholders by decreasing
liquidity, increasing the bid-ask spread, and therefore raising the cost of capital,
the firm would be free to withhold authorization.246
Moreover, the problem of adverse selection as a justification for
criminalizing issuer-licensed insider trading is less telling when considered in
light of the paradox of compliance for issuers. As explained above, legal
uncertainty combined with the threat of stiff penalties has forced firms to adopt
overly conservative preclearance requirements and extended blackout periods
for insider trading.247 These conservative policies choke the liquidity of shares
held by insiders (typically twenty-four to thirty-two percent of a firm’s
outstanding shares). 248 Permitting issuer-licensed insider trading would remove
the need for such conservative trading policies and therefore increase the
liquidity of these shares. This increase in liquidity would mitigate (perhaps
entirely offset) any tightening that might result from adverse selection.
Thus, on balance, these considerations suggest that (unlike issuer239. Id. at 89.
240. Id. at 98.
241. Id. (citing Merton H. Miller & Charles W. Upton, Strategies for Capital Market Structure
and Regulation, in MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATILITY 127,
142 (1991)).
242. See id. at 93, 96.
243. Henry G. Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2003, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104786934891514900.
244. E.g., Dolgopolov, supra note 237, at 109 (noting that market makers have not been among
those who complain of adverse selection from insider trading).
245. E.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 232, at 880.
246. See supra Part VI.B; see also Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 799. See
generaly Ayres & Choi, supra note 213 (explaining the advantages of allowing firms to control
informed trading decisions).
247. See supra Sections III and IV.
248. Fried, supra note 136, at 804. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the challenges to
enacting effective preclearance enforcement programs.
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proscribed and misappropriation trading) there are no moral or economic
grounds for regulating issuer-licensed insider trading. Consequently, an insider
trading enforcement regime that regulates issuer-proscribed insider trading and
misappropriation trading, but not issuer-licensed insider trading, would be
preferable to the current U.S. enforcement regime in terms of efficiency and
justice.249 Such a regime would also resolve the paradox of insider trading
compliance by synchronizing the interests of firms, shareholders, and regulators.
But what would such an enforcement regime look like?
VII. A PATH FORWARD
Though the introduction of Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans has proven
unsuccessful in resolving the paradox of insider trading compliance, such Plans
may nevertheless provide the roadmap for reform. As explained above, insiders’
strategic use of Trading Plans has been the subject of recent scrutiny by the
media and the SEC. 250 But strategic use of Trading Plans should give cause for
concern only if it results in harm or unfairness to investors or other market
participants.
Research suggests that the firms whose employees are using Plans to trade
strategically typically negotiate a proportionately lower salary.251 If true, this
means that firms are actually aware of and are licensing the strategic trading of
their employees.252 Moreover, studies reflect that firms whose employees use
Trading Plans to beat the market are more likely to disclose Plan use in their
regulatory filings.253 Where there is firm approval and public disclosure, strategic
Trading Plan use begins to resemble issuer-licensed insider trading as defined
above.254 Indeed, this author has argued elsewhere that, with a number of
modifications, 10b5-1(c) Trading Plans could provide the model for an
enforcement regime that permits harmless issuer-licensed insider trading while
continuing to proscribe issuer-proscribed and misappropriation trading.255
Under the proposed reform, a firm, at its discretion, would be permitted to
249. This author has suggested elsewhere that issuer-licensed insider trading is actually
consistent with the current insider trading regime as interpreted by the Supreme Court under
O’Hagan. Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, pt. VI.D, at 385–87. For similar arguments, see
Henderson, supra note 131, at 542–43; and Prakash, supra note 5, at 1516. But since the SEC has not
expressly recognized issuer-licensed insider trading as legal, it is doubtful any firm would risk an
enforcement proceeding to put this interpretation to the test.
250. See supra Section V.
251. Henderson, supra note 131, at 515 (noting that “firms restricting insiders’ ability to trade
pay about 13% more in total compensation than firms permitting insiders to trade freely”).
252. Id. at 537 (“[T]here is evidence that firms and executives bargain about insider-trading
profits, both from optimization trades and informed trades, and that these profits are considered in
meeting an executive’s reservation wage.”).
253. E.g., M. Todd Henderson, Alan Jagolinzer & Karl Muller, Hiding in Plain Sight: Can
Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns 20 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Coase-Sandor Working Paper
Series in Law & Econ., Paper No. 411, 2012), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1646&context=law_and_economics.
254. See Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, pt. VI.A, at 380–82.
255. Id.
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allow its employees to trade on the company’s material nonpublic information so
long as (1) the insider submits a plan to the firm that details the proposed trade,
(2) the firm authorizes that plan, (3) the firm has previously disclosed to the
investing public that it will permit its employees to trade on the firm’s material
nonpublic information when it is in the interest of the firm to grant such
permission,256 and (4) the firm discloses ex post all trading profits resulting from
the execution of these plans.257 In short, this modified trading plan regime
(“Modified Trading Plans” or “Modified Plans”) would offer an express safe
harbor for issuer-licensed insider trading while leaving the remainder of the
current insider trading enforcement regime in place to capture issuer-proscribed
and misappropriation insider trading.
The result would be a more rational and just insider trading enforcement
regime.258 It would be more rational because it would proscribe only conduct
that is harmful (issuer-proscribed and misappropriation trading) and permit
conduct that firms themselves have determined would benefit their shareholders
(issuer-licensed trading).259 Precious law enforcement dollars would no longer be
wasted on enforcing rules that do not benefit society. 260 And firms and
employees would no longer be forced to expend resources to defend against the
enforcement of such rules.261 The proposed regime would be more just because,
by permitting issuer-licensed insider trading, it would no longer impose stiff
criminal penalties on conduct that is, all things being equal, morally innocent.262
But most importantly, at least for purposes of this Article, the introduction of
Modified Trading Plans would dissolve the paradox of insider trading
compliance.
The Modified Trading Plan regime proposed here would no longer require
compliance officers to choose between the bad options. Under the current
insider trading enforcement regime, firms are forced to adopt overly
conservative, and therefore highly inefficient, compliance policies for fear of
regulatory scrutiny pursuant to a vague and ambiguous framework.263 By
256. See id. It should be noted that the disclosure requirement contemplated here would be
limited to notice of the firm’s discretionary use of Modified Trading Plans. It would not require the ex
ante disclosure of any Plan-specific information, or even of the creation, modification, or termination
of specific Modified Plans. The reason is that complete disclosure in advance of Modified Plan trades
would result in front-running that would deprive the insider of its advantage. Even partial ex ante
disclosure would likely generate more confusion than clarity because investors would likely build
expectations around Plans that might later be modified or terminated. Moreover, there is the risk that
the market might overreact to partial disclosure, risking harm to both insiders and other market
participants. See id. pt. VI.A, at 380–82 .
257. See id. at 379–88; see also Henderson, supra note 131, at 550–51.
258. See Anderson, A Sea Change, supra note 96, pt. VI.A, at 380–82.
259. See supra Part VI.B for a discussion of why there is nothing morally wrong with issuerlicensed insider trading. See also Anderson, What’s the Harm, supra note 203, at 789–99 (analyzing
harmful and beneficial conduct).
260. See supra Part VI.C.
261. See supra Part VI.C.
262. See supra Part VI.B.
263. See supra Sections III and IV.
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availing themselves of Modified Trading Plans, however, firms would be
permitted to reject only those trade requests there are firm-specific reasons for
rejecting. In other words, a firm’s best interests—rather than fear of regulatory
scrutiny—would dictate whether a Modified Plan is approved. This would be an
internal business decision that requires no subtle (and therefore risky)
interpretations of the law. Should a firm reject a Modified Trading Plan request,
and should an insider trade anyway, then, assuming such trading is based on
material nonpublic information, the insider would be subject to enforcement
action. But, under such circumstances, the firm’s interests would be aligned with
the regulators; the firm would have every reason to encourage enforcement.
The proposed enforcement regime would effectively eliminate the costs of
insider trading compliance for issuers. 264 Insiders would be less likely to bear ill
will over the rejection of proposed Modified Trading Plans because such
decisions would be based on business reasons, not suspicion of illegal conduct.265
Firms would also be free to determine the liquidity of their employees’ equity
compensation through their own management of Modified Plans. Such decisions
would be based on business reasons; they would no longer be determined by an
ever-present fear of SEC investigation under a vague and inscrutable
enforcement regime.266 Finally, firms would no longer be forced to adopt overly
conservative insider trading compliance regimes that could expose them to
liability for breaching contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to
their employees.267
CONCLUSION
Vagueness in the law translates into uncertainty for issuers in designing and
implementing insider trading compliance programs. Faced with the threat of stiff
sanctions for “ineffective” insider trading compliance programs, issuers are
forced to adopt compliance regimes that are marked by highly restrictive
preclearance decision making and extended blackout periods. But these play-itsafe compliance policies are purchased by issuers at a heavy price in terms of
corporate culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, and cost of capital.
Ultimately these costs are passed along to shareholders in terms of decreased
share value. The result is that insider trading regulations adopted to increase
value for shareholders are having the opposite effect.
The paradox of insider trading compliance for issuers throws the failings of
the current U.S. insider trading enforcement regime into stark relief. Whatever
advantages there are to uncertainty in the law of insider trading, this Article has
suggested that they are outweighed by its costs. To the extent that vagueness in
264. See supra Sections III and IV.
265. This is more favorable for businesses than the current expensive and ineffective
alternatives explored in Section III supra.
266. See supra Section IV for a discussion of how ambiguities in the law lead to challenges with
enforcement mechanisms.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 140–42 for a discussion of the liability firms face with
conservative compliance programs.
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the law is protected by the SEC and Congress to facilitate flexibility in
enforcement, we must ask ourselves what is more important. Is it racking up
convictions? Or is it promoting the values insider trading law was adopted to
promote (justice, fairness, liquidity, efficiency, and ultimately increased value for
shareholders)? Choose the cliché: Haven’t we put the cart before the horse?
Haven’t we lost the forest for the trees? In any event, the paradox of insider
trading compliance offers just one more reason why change is needed, and soon.
The reform proposed here is a vital option.

